PhilosophyBlogLog

Hurrah! for Here’s the Half Term Homework Come at last!

mrbrodie — Tue, 16 Feb 2010 21:53:00 +0000

It’s been a long weekend. And time is subject to perceptual variation. So bang on time is the promised homework.

The following four questions / tasks (the bullet pointed bits) MUST be done (even if you’re called Jake) by Monday 22nd February.

Seeing as you’re getting so good, have a go at these. They will require some thought, I had to think about them, but that means little as I have fewer brain cells than you.

What does a comparison of idealism and direct realism tell us about the difference between epistemology and ontology?

Why does solipsism threaten both idealism and representative realism? What philosopher(s) might we turn to for an escape from solipsism and how might he help us?

These are from the text book, p. 60, but are rather good: (I’ve got a bit of a hunch about Locke and primary / secondary qualities being in the exam – It is only a hunch and not inside information – unfortunately).

Say whether the following are examples of primary qualities, secondary qualities, both, or neither. Explain your thinking.


Heat	Velocity	Pleasure
Pain	Circularity	Colour
Existence	Mass	Atoms

Describe and illustrate one epistemological distinction between primary secondary qualities and one ontological one.

Doing Well!

mrbrodie — Tue, 26 Jan 2010 19:33:00 +0000

I have to say, I think you’re getting this Knowledge of the external world rather well, so far. But of course, I can’t be certain!

Representative, Indirect Realism

mrbrodie — Tue, 26 Jan 2010 19:32:00 +0000

This understanding of the way we perceive the world tries to get around the weaknesses of direct / naive realism by positing the idea of ‘sense data’ as intermediaries between the external world and and our perception of it.

The ‘sense data’ allow us to form a representation of the ‘real’ physical world. The ‘sense’ data are ‘mind-dependent’ and ‘object-independent’ they can exist when we are not currently perceiving the objects we are having sense data representations of (like in dreams or hallucinations) and they vary according to our perspective (perceptual variation or relativity) and circumstances. So hallucinations are occasions when sense data occur without any corresponding stimulus in the physical world. Similarly illusions are simply examples of the ‘sense data’ being unable to match up with reality accurately. Perceptual variation, is explained in the fact that ‘sense data’ are mind-dependent’ rather than object dependent and therefore vary according the individual’s different perspective or point of view on the world.

Although this theory seems to describe the way people experience the world more accurately than the clearly flawed naive realism, it has some very obvious problems of its own.

First of all it is not at all clear what the relationship is between the physical world and the ‘sense data’ that it seems to give rise to in us. If the sense data can be inaccurate as in the case of illusions, or entirely erroneous as in hallucinations, then how can we be sure that sense data actually represent anything at all?

Once the direct link between the supposed real physical world and our perception of it is called into doubt then the extent to which our representations of that world are accurate seems open to doubt, and a position of extreme scepticism (that the real world doesn’t exist at all) seems possible. Either that or you end up being an idealist like Berkeley, or mad like Scott.

Direct Realism ‘A conversation’

mrbrodie — Tue, 26 Jan 2010 19:19:00 +0000

‘How the world looks to me is how the world is. It’s obvious. What I see out there is what’s out there.’

‘What about illusions?

‘Wot about them?’

Don’t they prove that how the world appears is not necessarily how the world is?

‘Do what, son? ‘s jus’ a trick o’ the light, or summint, innit?’

‘But, what about hallucinations or the problem of perceptual relativity. If you accept that even once your perceptions do not match ‘reality’ then subsequently it’s impossible to have ontological certainty, surely.’

‘Oo you calling Shirley? You cheeky muppet! I’ll give you homological (sic) certainty, you pranny, take that!

‘Ah, you are quite correct, sir, the impact of your fist upon my nose has caused me a direct and .. . to be continued …

A more coherent defence of a form of direct realism is given by J.L. Austin. The text book mentions him, but doesn’t do him justice. We must when we revise.

Sense Data Homework: Due Monday

mrbrodie — Sat, 23 Jan 2010 18:02:00 +0000

Explain as fully as you can how ‘Sense data’ theories attempt to resolve the problems of naive direct realism. (Draw a diagram if you feel it necessary)

You should probably use the following terms in your explanation:

intermediary / intermediaries, mediate / mediation, represents / representation, mind-dependent / mind-independent, perceptual error, perceptual variation, subjective, objective.

And read the rest of the Russell (especially the bit about his cat!)

Christmas Philosophy ‘Ho Ho Ho’-mework!

mrbrodie — Wed, 30 Dec 2009 12:20:00 +0000

I’m back on line and broadcasting from hick country!
Hope you had a nice Christmas and will have a very happy and philosophically successful New Year!
Here’s the happy homework in case you haven’t done it yet.

1. Explain Kant’s claim that ‘synthetic a priori’ knowledge is possible. (plan below)

2. Explain what is meant by a priori and outline one reason why the a priori is philosophically significant. (15 marks)

Here is the mark scheme to help you so your answer should be perfect!

Expect the following definitions:

• A proposition or truth is a priori if it is known prior to and/or independently of experience.

• A proposition or truth is a priori if it cannot be refuted without contradiction.

• A proposition or truth is a priori if it is justly known through understanding one or more self-evident propositions. Descartes notion of ‘clear and distinct ideas’ may be used to illustrate the notion of self-evidence.

And one of the following reasons why the a priori is philosophically significant:

• A priori propositions or truths are philosophically significant because they are immune from sceptical doubts regarding the senses. Descartes’ methodological doubt and his deduction of the cogito could be used to illustrate this point.

• A priori propositions or truths are philosophically significant because they constitute what we know innately and therefore are crucial in explaining capacities we possess that would otherwise be inexplicable.

• A priori propositions or truths are philosophically significant because of what they reveal about the necessary structure of (our experience of) the world.

Unless a candidate answers both parts of the question they cannot achieve full marks.

3. ‘All ideas derive from the sense experiences which they copy.’ Discuss. (30 marks)

Expect the following discussion points:

• The claim sets a clear limit on thought and allows us to proceed without getting

distracted by empty metaphysical speculation.

• The claim reflects our experience of learning, where new ideas are acquired as we encounter new experiences.

• At least some ideas, (eg Hume’s example of a missing shade of blue, ‘4’) do not appear to derive from sense experience.

• Some ideas are best regarded as innate, (eg a Euclidean straight line, God).

• If all my ideas derive from my sense experience and all your ideas derive from your sense experience it follows that we can never share the same idea as we cannot have the same sense experience – reductio ad absurdum.

• If the claim is presented as a factual hypothesis then there is insufficient evidence to justify it.

• The theory implies that thinking involves the manipulation of mental images, sounds, smells, etc. This is psychologically implausible.

• The theory fails to appreciate the active power of the mind in shaping our experience.

• The theory inevitably degenerates into a solipsistic scepticism that it hasn’t got the resources to escape from.

• The theory has problems accounting for general terms or universals.

• The term ‘idea’ is ambiguous, (eg is ‘the cat sat on the mat’ one or more idea(s)?).

Candidates could usefully refer to individual philosophers, (eg. Hume, Locke,

Russell, Descartes) in order to illustrate their discussion.

Free Stuff!

mrbrodie — Sat, 12 Dec 2009 20:31:00 +0000

If you go here, you can download loads of excellent summaries of all the stuff we’ve studied so far. Some of it I have given you (sometimes in edited form) but there’s loads I haven’t. Beware the powerpoints, some of which are a little confusing I think.

http://www.routledge.com/textbooks/philosophy/resources-as.asp

Kant!

mrbrodie — Sat, 12 Dec 2009 20:27:00 +0000

Here is the marvellous Kant plan. Sorry I haven’t added anything to it, but that’s your job! I’m too busy packing my life into boxes.

Rationalism & Science & Maths & what you really think but don’t even know yourselves!

mrbrodie — Mon, 16 Nov 2009 20:35:00 +0000

We learned (didn’t we?) that there is a strand of rationalist philosophy, that still just about persists, that wants to claim for philosophy, the kind of certainty that science and maths claims. It wants to be able to find the kind of ‘objective’ ‘a priori’, necessary truth that mathematical theories have, it wants to be able to do what science does and abstract ‘universal‘ laws and principles from its observations. It wants to be able to say ‘this is how things really are!’ It wants to strip away appearance and uncover the ‘reality’ behind it.

Most of you seem to think that you think it can’t do this. Most of you seem to think that you think there is no objective truth, but I don’t believe you really think it. After all aren’t claims like ‘the Earth goes round the Sun’ closer to being true than the claim that ‘the Sun goes round the Earth.’? So doesn’t that mean that science is getting closer to the Truth?

Do you really think that the only measure of truth is agreement? I don’t think you really think that if we all agreed that eating custard creams prevented heart disease then it would be true that eating custard creams prevented heart disease.

I think you all really think that there is a ‘way things really are’.

But I don’t. So there.

Lots of new stuff!

mrbrodie — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 18:31:00 +0000

I’ve put lots of new stuff on here this weekend so please take the time and trouble to read it carefully. Some comments would be nice also. Even if you think you understand something it is ALWAYS worth reading about it and going over again in your mind.